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AS THE ONLY PLACE IN THE UShealth care system that servesall patients, emergency de-partments (EDs) are the
“safety net of the safety net.”1 Federal
law requires hospital EDs to evaluate
and treat all patients in need of emer-
gency care regardless of ability to pay.2
Although only 4% of US physicians
work in a hospital ED, it is estimated
that they provide more acute care to
Medicaid beneficiaries and the unin-
sured than the rest of US physicians
combined.3
The US Congress recently enacted
legislation to promote regionalization
of emergency care, to increase effi-
ciency, and to improve outcomes.4 De-
spite recognition that emergency care
is an essential health benefit,2 no fed-
eral law ensures the availability of hos-
pital EDs.
The total number of hospital-based
EDs declined 3.3%, from 4771 to 4613,
between 1998 and 2008. In this same
period, ED visits increased by 30%,
from 94.8 million visits to 123 million
visits annually.5 ED use by publicly in-
sured and uninsured patients in-
creased at an even faster pace, largely
driven by loss of access to care in other
settings.3
Market forces strongly influence ac-
cess to health care in the United States;
however, little is known about risk fac-
tors associated with ED closures. We
hypothesized thatmarket forces are as-
sociated with the ability of an ED to re-
main open. We analyzed factors that
might be associated with the closure of
hospital EDs, including hospital, com-
munity, and market characteristics.
METHODS
Study Design and Data Sources
We determined the numbers of EDs in
operation in the United States from
1990 to 2009, and we also performed
a survival analysis of ED closures for
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Context Between 1998 and 2008, the number of hospital-based emergency depart-
ments (EDs) in the United States declined, while the number of ED visits increased,
particularly visits by patients who were publicly insured and uninsured. Little is known
about the hospital, community, and market factors associated with ED closures. Fed-
eral law requiring EDs to treat all in need regardless of a patient’s ability to pay may
make EDs more vulnerable to the market forces that govern US health care.
Objective To determine hospital, community, and market factors associated with
ED closures.
Design Emergency department and hospital organizational information from 1990
through 2009 was acquired from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual
Surveys (annual response rates ranging from 84%-92%) and merged with hospital
financial and payer mix information available through 2007 from Medicare hospital
cost reports. We evaluated 3 sets of risk factors: hospital characteristics (safety net [as
defined by hospitals caring for more than double their Medicaid share of discharges
compared with other hospitals within a 15-mile radius], ownership, teaching status,
system membership, ED size, case mix), county population demographics (race, pov-
erty, uninsurance, elderly), and market factors (ownership mix, profit margin, loca-
tion in a competitive market, presence of other EDs).
Setting All general, acute, nonrural, short-stay hospitals in the United States with
an operating ED anytime from 1990-2009.
Main Outcome Measure Closure of an ED during the study period.
Results From1990 to2009, thenumberofhospitalswithEDs innonrural areasdeclined
from2446 to1779,with1041EDsclosingand374hospitalsopeningEDs.Basedonanaly-
sisof2814urbanacute-carehospitals, constituting36335hospital-yearobservationsover
an18-year study interval (1990-2007), for-profit hospitals and thosewith lowprofitmar-
ginsweremore likely to close than their counterparts (cumulativehazard ratebasedonbi-
variatemodel, 26%vs16%;hazard ratio [HR],1.8;95%confidence interval [CI], 1.5-2.1,
and 36%vs 18%;HR, 1.9; 95%CI, 1.6-2.3, respectively). Hospitals inmore competitive
markets hada significantly higher risk of closing their EDs (34%vs17%;HR,1.3; 95%CI,
1.1-1.6), asdid safety-nethospitals (10%vs6%;HR,1.4;95%CI,1.1-1.7)andthoseserv-
ing a higher share of populations in poverty (37% vs 31%; HR, 1.4; 95% CI, 1.1-1.7).
Conclusion From 1990 to 2009, the number of hospital EDs in nonrural areas de-
clined by 27%, with for-profit ownership, location in a competitive market, safety-
net status, and low profit margin associated with increased risk of ED closure.
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all general, acute, nonfederal short-
stay hospitals in the United States from
1990 to 2007. We excluded hospitals
that were not in metropolitan statisti-
cal areas because rural hospitals are
sometimes designated “critical access
hospitals” and operate under different
federal mandates and supports.6
ED and hospital organizational in-
formation was obtained from the
American Hospital Association (AHA)
Annual Surveys.7 Response rates dif-
fer by year (eg, 92% for 1990-1994, 85%
for 1995-1999, 86% for 2000-2007, and
84% for 2008-2009) and vary depend-
ing on data item.8 Because financial data
are not available fromAHA surveys, we
obtained these data from the Health-
care Cost Report Information System
(HCRIS) from the Centers for Medi-
care&Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS
programs internal consistency checks
within its cost report software to re-
duce the incidence of obvious incon-
sistencies and missing data.9,10
County population characteristics
were obtained from the Area Resource
File (ARF)11 and a wage index (a proxy
for the cost of living) from Prospec-
tive Payment System (PPS) impact
files.12 To quantify local hospital com-
petition, we used a widely accepted
measure, the Herfindahl index.13 The
Herfindahl indexmeasures the amount
of competition among hospitals within
the samemarket. It is calculated as the
sum of the squares of the market share
among hospitals that are within a 15-
mile radius, wheremarket share ismea-
sured using hospital discharges. For ex-
ample, if a hospital is the only hospital
within the market it is serving, it has
100% market share, so the Herfindahl
index for a monopolistic market is
10 000. Our analysis of risk factors for
ED closure was based on data through
2007, the latest year of full data from
all data sources. This study was ex-
empt from review by the committee on
human research at the University of
California, San Francisco.
Outcome Measure
Guided by previous literature,14,15 the
definition of the opening year of an ED
was set as the first year of the first con-
secutive 2 years in which a hospital re-
ported operation of anED.Closure year
was defined as the year after the last year
in which the hospital indicated on its
AHA survey that it operated anED.Our
goal was to identify risk factors re-
lated to closures of emergency ser-
vices to a community. We therefore
evaluated closures of EDs as a whole,
whether they resulted from closures of
hospitals that offered ED services or
from hospitals that remained open but
closed their EDs as a service line.
Statistical Methods
The analysis only included hospitals
with an ED at any point in the study
period. Hospitals that had an ED prior
to 1990 entered themodel that year, and
hospitals that opened EDs later en-
tered the model in the year of the op-
ening. The study interval (1990-
2007) provided 18 one-year intervals
during which ED closure could occur.
To identify possible risk factors for
ED closure, we used discrete-time pro-
portional hazard models.16,17 We first
analyzed bivariate relationships of the
risk factors to the outcome of closure
and then included all covariates for a
fully adjusted model, using Stata ver-
sion 11 (StataCorp, College Station,
Texas) for all analyses. We used the
conventional 5% level of significance
with 2-sided testing. The independent
variables are noted next; a summary of
the data source for the variables ap-
pears in eFigure 1 (available at http:
//www.jama.com).
Hospital-Specific Characteristics.
We described each hospital according
to characteristics used in other analy-
ses examining service provision, in-
cluding ownership status (for-profit,
not-for-profit, and government), teach-
ing status, systemmembership, ED size
(annual visits to the hospital’s ED as
proxy), and case-mix index.15,18 All
aforementioned variables were ob-
tained from the AHA surveys, with the
exception of case-mix index,whichwas
obtained fromPPS impact files. The lat-
ter captures the average severity of ill-
ness among patients that the hospital
receives. A case-mix index of 1 indi-
cates the hospital’s patient popula-
tion’s sickness level is at the national
average. A higher case-mix index rep-
resents a sicker patient population. For
ease of interpretation, we grouped hos-
pitals into 3 categories: those in the
lower one-third of the case-mix index
distribution (healthier patients than the
average), middle one-third, and upper
one-third (sicker patients than the
average).
We also included each hospital’s total
profit margin, as in previous litera-
ture.18 UsingHCRIS,we calculated total
profit margin as the ratio of the net rev-
enue (total revenue, including dispro-
portionate share payments, minus total
costs) divided by the total costs. To
smooth year-to-year variations in the
measurement of financial data and to
account for the fact that financial con-
siderations thatwould influence the de-
cision to close an EDwere likely to oc-
cur a few years preceding the actual
closure, we constructed the profit mar-
gin variable as a 3-year moving aver-
age (ie, the profit margin value for a
2003 observation is the average from
2001-2003). Based on the empirical dis-
tribution of this profit margin, we cre-
ated 2 binary indicators to depict each
hospital’s financial status: hospitals
whose profit margin was at the upper
quartile of the profit distribution (profit
margin8.9%) and those with a profit
margin at the lower quartile of the dis-
tribution (0%).18
We included safety-net status as a
characteristic because it has been
reported that thesehospitals carry a dis-
proportionate burden of unreim-
bursed care.19 The Institute of Medi-
cine described safety-net hospitals as
those that “organize and deliver a sig-
nificant level of health care and other
related services to uninsured, Medic-
aid and other vulnerable patients.”20
Although the Institute ofMedicine did
not propose a specific operational defi-
nition, others have.18,19,21-24 Many use
hospital characteristics (such as teach-
ing or county-owned facilities); others
focus on the amount of charity care pro-
vided compared with a given standard
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(eg, by state or nationwide).21,22,24 We
opted for an index that is service-
oriented rather than one based on orga-
nizational characteristics.19,21 Many
economists have used proportions of
Medicaid patients served (or hospital
days)asamorestraightforwardapproach
todeterminesafety-netdesignation.23,25,26
We defined a safety-net hospital di-
chotomously as one that providesmore
than double the Medicaid share (mea-
sured by number of discharges as re-
corded inHCRIS) comparedwith com-
peting hospitals within a 15-mile radius
of the facility.27,28 For example, if the av-
erage Medicaid share in the hospital
market is 15%, a hospital that has 30%
ormoreMedicaid discharges is consid-
ered a safety-net hospital. We believe
this is a more conservative and accu-
rate approach in that it accounts for the
population of Medicaid-eligible pa-
tients. For example, in a highly in-
sured community, there may not be a
hospital that qualifies as safety net based
on a static metric (eg, defined as 1 SD
above the state average Medicaid
caseload)19,23,25 but could indeed be the
safety-net hospital for that area if it
provides the greatest share of care for
the population in need. The 15-mile
radius is a standard measure of a hos-
pital market.29-32 We also conducted a
sensitivity analysis using a narrower
(10-mile) market radius.
County-Level Characteristics. In
eachhospital’s county,we calculated the
percentages of the population that were
minority, poor, elderly, and uninsured
based on ARF data—groups associ-
ated with ED use.19 Minority was de-
fined as nonwhite race based on the
ARF, which is derived from the yearly
county census population. Poorwas de-
fined as the percentage of the popula-
tion living below the poverty level. Each
categorical variable was divided into
low,medium, andhigh based on the ter-
tiles of the distribution of the charac-
teristics.We also controlled for the size
of each county’s population and the lo-
cal cost of living (ie, wage index as re-
ported by PPS impact files).
Market Characteristics. We se-
lectedmarket factors associatedwith the
likelihood of offering certain services:
presence of another ED located within
a 15-mile radius, whether the hospital
was located in a competitive market
(defined as Herfindahl index2500),
and whether there was another for-
profit or government-owned hospital
within the 15-mile radius.27,28 Each of
these variables was dichotomized.
RESULTS
In 1990, our sample included 2446hos-
pitals with EDs in nonrural areas. By
2009, that number had declined by
27%, to 1779 across the United States
(FIGURE 1 and eFigure 2). During the
study interval, 1041 EDs closed, an av-
erage of 89 per year. Of the 1041 ED
closures, themajority (66%, or n=690)
were due to the closure of an entire hos-
pital that operated the ED. For the re-
maining 34% (n=351), the EDs were
closed but the hospital stayed open.
During the study interval, 374EDswere
opened. There was therefore a net loss
of 667 nonrural EDs during 1990-
2009. The overall sample analyzed
(1990-2007) included 2814 hospitals,
contributing a total of 36 335 hospital-
years to the analysis.
We found significant differences in
the characteristics of local hospitalmar-
kets and the facilities (TABLE1). Tenper-
cent of hospitals that closed their EDs
met our criteria for safety-net centers,
compared with 6% of those that kept
their EDs open. Closed EDs were more
likely to be at for-profit hospitals than
EDs that stayed open (26% vs 16%,
P .001). Smaller facilities were more
likely to close their ED (closed EDs re-
ported a mean of 22 404 annual visits,
compared with 33 691 in open facili-
ties, P .001); and twice as many hos-
pitals that closed their EDs were in the
lowest quartile of the profit margin dis-
tribution, comparedwith those that kept
their EDs open (P .001). We also
found that EDs that closed tended to be
located in counties with high shares of
minority populations (36% vs 31%,
P=.005), high shares of populations in
poverty (37% vs 31%, P .001), and
more than 15% of its individuals with-
out insurance (42% vs 36%, P=.002).
Thirty-four percent of hospitals that
closed their EDs were in highly com-
petitivemarkets, comparedwith 17%of
those with EDs that did not close
(P .001).
FIGURE2 shows the observedKaplan-
Meier survival curves of EDs by safety-
net status, ownership status, poverty
level, and profit margin. At the end of
the study period, the cumulative prob-
ability of an ED remaining open among
safety-net hospitals was about 50%,
comparedwith 74%amongnon–safety-
net hospitals. In terms of hospital own-
ership, the cumulative probability for
Figure 1. Trends in Emergency Department Operation and Closures in Urban Areas,
1990-2009
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an ED to remain open was 50% among
for-profit hospitals comparedwith 75%
for the other 2 ownership types. Simi-
larly, EDs at hospitals with negative
profit margin (ie, the lowest quartile of
profit margin distribution) had a 50%
cumulative probability of remaining
open compared with the 75% cumula-
tive probability of remaining open for
EDs at hospitals in the other 3 quar-
tiles. EDs in hospitals in counties with
a high share of the population in pov-
erty (upper tertile) had a lower cumu-
lative probability (70%) of remaining
open compared with hospitals serving
a low share of population in poverty.
TABLE2presents the results of theun-
adjusted (bivariate) hazard ratios (HRs)
as well as the adjusted (multivariate)
HRs. The third column of Table 2 re-
ports the HR based on the bivariate
model, while the second column re-
ports the corresponding cumulativehaz-
ard rate from thatmodel. By default, the
reference group has an HR of 1. In the
unadjusted analysis, EDs at safety-net
hospitals were more likely to be closed
than EDs at non–safety-net hospitals
(HR, 1.6; 95% confidence interval [CI],
1.3-2.0). EDs in counties with higher
percentages of minority populations
were at higher risk of closure (HR, 1.3;
95% CI, 1.1-1.6), as were those located
in counties with higher shares of popu-
lations in poverty (HR, 1.4; 95%CI, 1.2-
1.7). EDs serving communities of un-
insuredpatients, defineddichotomously
as communities withmore than 15% of
its individuals uninsured, were also at
higher risk of closure (HR, 1.2; 95%CI,
1.1-1.4). In addition, EDs at for-profit
hospitals and hospitals in more com-
petitive markets were more likely to
close (HR, 1.9 and 1.7; 95% CI, 1.6-2.2
and 1.5-2.0, respectively). EDs at hos-
pitals in the lowest quartile of profitmar-
gin (0%) alsoweremore likely to close
than EDs at hospitals with profit mar-
gins in the other 3 quartiles (HR, 2.5;
95% CI, 2.1-3.0).
The last column of Table 2 displays
the adjustedHRs of each risk factor. The
adjusted HRs are the results of a fully
adjusted model that includes vari-
ables listed in the table (hospital, com-













Safety-net hospital 208 (7) 114 (6) 95 (10) .001
Teaching hospital 298 (11) 225 (12) 73 (8) .001
Not-for-profit hospital 1917 (68) 1312 (70) 604 (65) .004
For-profit hospital 544 (19) 305 (16) 238 (26) .001
Government hospital 353 (13) 263 (14) 90 (10) .001
Profit margin in lowest
quartile
679 (24) 343 (18) 336 (36) .001
Profit margin in highest
quartile
567 (20) 422 (22) 145 (16) .001
Member of a system 1761 (63) 1187 (63) 574 (62) .35
Case-mix indexb
Low 897 (32) 574 (31) 323 (35) .008
Medium 899 (32) 595 (32) 304 (33) .48
High 885 (31) 639 (34) 246 (26) .001
Average annual visits
to ED, No.
29 949 33 691 22 404 .001
County Population Characteristicsc
Share of minority population
Low 926 (33) 659 (35) 267 (29) .001
Medium 937 (33) 622 (33) 314 (34) .72
High 928 (33) 589 (31) 339 (36) .005
Share of poverty population
Low 923 (33) 663 (35) 260 (28) .001
Medium 938 (33) 623 (33) 315 (34) .67




1075 (38) 681 (36) 394 (42) .002
Share of elderly population
Low 927 (33) 642 (34) 285 (31) .05
Medium 918 (33) 617 (33) 301 (32) .75
High 947 (34) 612 (33) 335 (36) .06
Average population size
in the county, No.
1 084 586 1 019 699 1 216 821 .009
Average cost of living
index








639 (23) 323 (17) 316 (34) .001
1 for-profit hospital within
15-mile radius
1355 (48) 847 (45) 508 (54) .001
1 government hospital
within 15-mile radius
1274 (45) 765 (41) 509 (55) .001
Abbreviation: ED, emergency department.
aTotal sample is all hospitals with EDs at some point during the study period, an 18-year study interval that constituted
36 335 hospital-year observations.
bWe grouped hospitals into 3 categories of case-mix index distribution: those in the lower one-third (healthier patients
than national average), middle one-third, and upper one-third (sicker patients than national average).
cEach categorical variable was divided into low, medium, and high based on the tertiles of the distribution of the char-
acteristics.
dHerfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market share among hospitals that are within a 15-mile
radius, where market share is measured using hospital discharges. If a hospital is the only hospital within the market
it is serving, it would have 100% market share, so the Herfindahl index would be 10 000.
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munity, andmarket factors). Three hos-
pital-specific characteristics were
associated with an increased risk of ED
closures, including safety-net status
(HR, 1.4; 95% CI, 1.1-1.7), for-profit
status (comparedwith not-for-profit or
government hospitals; HR, 1.8; 95%CI,
1.5-2.1), and hospitals with profit mar-
gins in the lowest quartile (HR, 1.9; 95%
CI, 1.6-2.3).
In analyzing community demo-
graphic risk factors, the bivariate asso-
ciations of communities with high pro-
portions of minority populations and
lack of insurance with closure were at-
tenuated and no longer statistically sig-
nificant after multivariate adjustment,
suggesting that theremay be partialme-
diation of these factors with profit mar-
gin and hospital ownership. However,
even after fully adjusting for all fac-
tors in the model, EDs in communi-
ties with the highest percentage of
population in poverty were at in-
creased risk of closure (HR, 1.4; 95%
CI, 1.1-1.7).
In our analysis of market factors, we
found that presence of another ED
within a 15-mile radius also was asso-
ciatedwith increased risk of ED closure
(HR, 1.8; 95% CI, 1.3-2.5). Similarly,
hospitals in areas with high levels of
competition as measured by a lower
Herfindahl index were at higher risk of
closure (HR, 1.3; 95% CI, 1.1-1.6).
In our sensitivity analyses, we esti-
mated our model using an alternative
safety-net definition (ie, 30% of in-
patient discharges belong to Medic-
aid, which is 1 criterion of the Centers
forDiseaseControl andPreventiondefi-
nition19)with very similar results. In ad-
dition, the 15-mile radius is a stan-
dard definition for a hospitalmarket29-32;
we repeated the model using a more
conservative 10-mile radius estimate
with no significant departure from our
results.




































































2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
For-profit 485 454 408 407 384 381 362 326 266
Government 394 387 359 330 317 270 262 251 216
































2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Low poverty 940 924 869 804 769 721 688 664 557
Medium poverty 941 949 841 775 756 710 657 614 534




























2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Lower quartile 728 661 529 395 442 545 407 362 274
Upper quartile 507 491 498 559 648 487 726 268 241
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COMMENT
Our nationwide analysis of ED clo-
sures between 1990 and 2007 identi-
fied several risk factors that suggest eco-
nomic drivers are associated with ED
closures. Hospital-specific characteris-
tics related to higher risk of closurewere
safety-net status, for-profit ownership,
and low profit margin. After control-
ling for demographic and market fac-
tors, safety-net hospitals are at higher
risk of closing their EDs comparedwith
non–safety-net hospitals, suggesting that
safety-net hospital status reflects other
pressures that, although less measur-
able, are associatedwithEDclosure. For
example, someEDshavedifficultymain-
taining a full on-call panel of specialty
physicians because of unwillingness of
specialists to cover emergency calls, es-
pecially for poorly insured patients.33-35
While this finding deservesmore study,
it signals that safety-net hospitals may
require particular attention if emer-
gency care access is to be sustained.
Hospitals in counties where a high
proportion of residents live in poverty
weremore likely to close their EDs than
hospitals in more economically secure
communities. Factors such as crowd-
ing and the increasing challenges of pro-
viding high-quality care in the face of
burgeoning demand could contribute to
difficulty in recruiting and maintaining
staff at all levels. These community-
characteristic findingsareespecially com-
pelling given that vulnerable popula-
tions, including those inminority groups
and both uninsured and underinsured
patients, useEDs for acute care at greater
rates thanotherpopulations.36,37 Asmore
of these patients lose access to primary
care, an increasing number of EDs are
meeting criteria as safety-net facili-
ties,37which suggests thatmoreEDsmay
be at risk of closing in the future. EDclo-
sures canhave substantial effects on vul-
nerable communities, causing a decline
in care as hospitals serving poor andmi-
nority populations select to provide ser-
vices based on profitability rather than
community health needs.38
Localmarket competition is strongly
associated with the ability of an ED to
remain open. The presence of other EDs






Non–safety-net 0.37 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Safety-net 0.59 1.6 (1.3-2.0) 1.4 (1.1-1.7)
Nonteaching 0.40 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Teaching 0.24 0.6 (0.4-0.7) 0.6 (0.5-0.9)
Not-for-profit 0.34 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
For-profit 0.65 1.9 (1.6-2.2) 1.8 (1.5-2.1)
Government 0.27 0.8 (0.6-1.0) 0.9 (0.7-1.1)
Break-even (no profit) 0.27 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Profit margin in lowest quartile 0.68 2.5 (2.1-3.0) 1.9 (1.6-2.3)
Profit margin in highest quartile 0.25 0.9 (0.7-1.1) 0.9 (0.7-1.1)
Not member of a system 0.37 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Member of a system 0.41 1.1 (0.9-1.2) 1.0 (0.8-1.1)
Low case-mix indexc 0.48 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Medium case-mix indexc 0.38 0.8 (0.7-0.9) 0.8 (0.7-0.9)
High case-mix indexc 0.29 0.6 (0.5-0.7) 0.8 (0.6-1.0)
Total visits to ED, log-transformedd 0.8 (0.8-0.8) 0.8 (0.8-0.8)
County Population Characteristicse
Share of minority population
Low 0.32 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Medium 0.41 1.3 (1.1-1.5) 1.3 (1.1-1.6)
High 0.41 1.3 (1.1-1.6) 1.1 (0.9-1.4)
Share of poverty population
Low 0.31 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Medium 0.37 1.2 (1.0-1.5) 1.2 (1.0-1.5)
High 0.44 1.4 (1.2-1.7) 1.4 (1.1-1.7)
15% population uninsured in 2000 0.36 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
15% population uninsured in 2000 0.43 1.2 (1.1-1.4) 0.9 (0.7-1.1)
Share of elderly population
Low 0.36 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Medium 0.36 1.0 (0.8-1.2) 1.0 (0.9-1.3)
High 0.43 1.2 (1.0-1.4) 1.2 (1.0-1.5)
Population size, log-transformedd 1.1 (1.1-1.2) 1.1 (1.0-1.1)
Cost of livingd 1.2 (0.8-1.8) 0.5 (0.2-1.0)
Market Characteristics
Only ED within 15-mile radius 0.21 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Another ED present within 15-mile radius 0.40 1.9 (1.5-2.5) 1.8 (1.3-2.5)
Located in concentrated market 0.34 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
Located in competitive market (Herfindahl index2500)f 0.57 1.7 (1.5-2.0) 1.3 (1.1-1.6)
No for-profit hospital within 15-mile radius 0.34 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
1 for-profit hospital within 15-mile radius 0.44 1.3 (1.1-1.4) 1.0 (0.8-1.2)
No government hospital within 15-mile radius 0.33 1 [Reference] 1 [Reference]
1 government hospital within 15-mile radius 0.43 1.3 (1.2-1.5) 1.1 (0.9-1.3)
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; ED, emergency department; HR, hazard ratio.
aBased on bivariate model.
bThe multivariate model is adjusted for all covariates listed in this table as well as indicators for 4 census regions.
cWe grouped hospitals into 3 categories of case-mix index distribution: those in the lower one-third (healthier patients than
national average), middle one-third, and upper one-third (sicker patients than national average).
dAnnual ED visits weremeasured by number of visits, population wasmeasured by counts of people, andwage index was
an index produced by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services capturing the relative labor cost of the hospital’s
geographicalmarket relative to the national average labor cost for hospital. The index ranges from0.66-1.93 in the sample.
ED visits and population counts were log-transformed.
eCounty population characteristics are determined yearly from the Area Resource File; during the study period, the aver-
age proportions of each characteristic (lower tertile, middle tertile, upper tertile) were as follows: poverty (7%, 13%, 19%),
minority (5%, 16%, 36%), and elderly (9%, 12%, and 16%). Each categorical variable was divided into low,medium, and
high based on the tertiles of the distribution of the characteristics.
fHerfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market share among hospitals that are within a 15-mile
radius, where market share is measured using hospital discharges. If a hospital is the only hospital within the market it is
serving, it would have 100% market share, so the Herfindahl index would be 10000.
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within a 15-mile radius andhighly com-
petitive markets are both associated
with increased risk of ED closures. Pre-
vious literature reported that emer-
gency services in areas with poor payer
mix are oftenmoney losers.18 Our study
extends this finding, showing thatmar-
ket forces, beyond profit margin alone,
are substantially related to the ability
of an ED to remain open.
Our findingsexpand theevidencebase
by showing that economic factors re-
lated to ED closures are similar to those
related to hospital closures and may be
even stronger.18,39 All factors (except for
the increased risk of hospitals serving a
higher proportion of patients in pov-
erty) identified inour studycanbeshown
to be market-driven. Profit margin, for
example, is influenced by a number of
factors ranging from patient payer mix,
reimbursement decisions from payers
(and negotiated discounts between hos-
pitals and payers), to competition.Mar-
ket factors may also be the reason that
many for-profit hospitals choose not to
provide emergency services.
In some areas, the episodic closure of
EDs may be of little consequence, par-
ticularly in competitive health caremar-
kets where nearby facilities can deliver
the needed clinical care for patientswho
seek ED treatment. Some might assert
that such“creativedestruction” is amani-
festation of a healthymarketplace.How-
ever, themarket economics ofUShealth
care, particularly emergencycare, aredis-
torted by the fact that 51millionAmeri-
cans lack health insurance, and another
48million are covered byMedicaid and
other forms of public insurance that re-
imburse well below cost.40 With health
care reform, the numbers of individuals
covered byMedicaid and other forms of
public insurance are likely to increase
substantially, with far-reaching implica-
tions if these patients cannot access
timely and adequate care. Inmost of the
US health care system, an effective busi-
ness strategy is tominimize uncompen-
sated costs by declining to treat these pa-
tients, but EDs cannot do so.
The economic challenge of operating
an ED in the face of a federal obligation
may explain, in part, why for-profit hos-
pitals were twice as likely to close their
EDsas facilities that arenonprofit orpub-
liclyowned. Itmayalso explainwhyhos-
pitals in the lowest quartile of profitabil-
ity (essentially,negativeprofitability) and
those inhighly competitivemarketswere
more likely to close their EDs. Yet even
after controlling for these andother char-
acteristics, we observed that safety-net
hospitals were significantly more likely
to close their EDs thanhospitals that did
not serve this role.
The closure of an ED can have pro-
found repercussions for a commu-
nity.41-43 Closures can adversely affect ac-
cess to emergency care for everyone—
insured and uninsured alike.41 Hospital
closures significantly affect access to care
not onlyby increasing thedistance to the
nearest hospital but also by increasing
the patient load at neighboring hospi-
tals.44 ED crowding degrades quality of
care, not only by prolonging patient
waiting times and increasing the rate of
patients who leave without being seen,
but also in terms of outcomes, includ-
ing increased rates of morbidity and
mortality.45-47 BecauseMedicaid, SCHIP,
and uninsured patients are highly reli-
ant on hospital EDs for acute care,3 ED
closure can displace tens of thousands
of uninsured and low-income patients
to other EDs, worsening crowding and
potentially setting the stage for addi-
tional closures.48-50
Our analysis has several limita-
tions.Wewere only able to analyze fac-
tors that are regularly quantified across
hospitals and communities. A deci-
sion to open or close a hospital or its
EDmay depend on a wide range of fac-
tors, including political consider-
ations, community pressures, local phil-
anthropic support, and a hospital’s
ability to fill its bed with non-ED ad-
missions.We also did not examine fed-
eral hospitals, such as those operated
by the Veterans Administration, which
provide ED access to certain popula-
tions. Also, our financial data and analy-
sis of risk factors associated with ED
closures are based on data through
2007, the most recent year for which
complete data were available. We sus-
pect that with the economic recession
that followed in subsequent years, some
hospitalsmost likely faced increased fi-
nancial pressures that may have influ-
enced decisions regarding maintain-
ing or closing their EDs.
It is critical to determinewhether and
how to engage society in decisions to
maintain or close EDs and other safety-
net services. Should such decisions be
dictated strictly by market forces, or
should other considerations apply?51
Calls for legislation to regulate the clo-
sure of hospital EDs were first made
more than 2 decades ago.52 Experi-
ence has shown that suchmeasures are
difficult to enact and even harder to
implement.53 Although some might
consider it prudent to require detailed
patient outcome data before taking ac-
tion to regulate ED closures, waiting to
quantify these potential adverse con-
sequences is far from ideal, especially
because no government or nongovern-
mental body is charged with monitor-
ing and reporting these trends.
Our findings underscore thatmarket-
based approaches to health care do not
ensure that care will be equitably dis-
tributed.54 In fact, the opposite may be
true.As longas tensofmillionsofAmeri-
cans are uninsured, and tens of mil-
lions more pay well below their cost of
care, the push for “results-driven com-
petition”55 will not correct system-
level disparities that markets cannot—
and shouldnot—be expected to resolve.
In summary, this study demon-
strated that from 1990 to 2009, the
number of hospital EDs in nonrural
areas declined by 27%, with for-profit
ownership, location in a competitive
market, safety-net status, and lowprofit
margin associated with increased risk
of ED closure.
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